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Abstract— The impact of coordinated malicious attacks may 
be dramatically severe and may yield a wide area blackout. A 
preventive measure is enhancing the infrastructure through 
investment. Due to limited budget, a decision making is required 
to select the best possible options, considering cost/benefit ratio. 
We designed a time-step simulation framework representing the 
evolution of post-contingency failures and load/system 
restoration. System unserved energy is translated into economic 
losses. Different enhancement options can be compared in terms 
of benefit (reduction in the cost of unserved energy) and of cost 
(investments needed) to eventually rank them. The simulation 
framework also provides a way to derive an optimal lost load 
recovering strategy to accelerate system restoration. In this paper 
the simulation framework is applied to a real network (Austrian 
transmission grid) to evaluate the technical and economic 
impacts of a coordinated malicious attack. 
Keywords— Malicious threats, Cost benefit analysis, Power 
System Security, Time-Step Simulation, Transmission 
Infrastructure Enhancement. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
With the extensive growth of malicious activities, power 
systems, as key critical infrastructures, are attracting terrorists’ 
attention. The impact may be dramatically severe and may 
yield more frequent blackouts [1]. In recent years, malicious 
attacks started to occur and a growing trend has been observed. 
Malicious threats to power systems can be originated by 
intentional actions from different agents (terrorists, criminal 
groups, cyber attackers, copper thieves, vandals, psychotics, 
malware writers, etc.) by various means (explosives, high 
power rifles, malware, etc.) with the willingness to cause 
damage for personal, political, or economic benefits. From 
1999 to 2002, there were more than 150 deliberate attacks to 
power systems around the world [2]. Since September 11, 
2001, efforts to prevent and protect power systems against 
growing malicious threats had a sudden increase with 
international security concerns [3]. Modelling and simulation 
of malicious attacks to power systems is becoming a hot area 
of research nowadays [4]. 
Malicious attacks, by incapacitating or destructing power 
systems may have a debilitating impact on many different 
society sectors like health, safety, security and economy. Power 
systems consist of three layers: a physical layer including the 
network infrastructure components like power plants, 
transmission lines, transformers, etc. and also physical 
equipment supporting information flows and communication 
system; a human layer including both the employees to be 
protected and the personnel who may present an insider threat 
(e.g., due to privileged access to control systems, operations, 
and sensitive area and information); and a cyber layer, 
including the communication network and information system 
which serve the functioning and operation of electric power 
system, which takes a critical role in control, dispatching, and 
other operational affairs. 
A malicious threat can trigger an initiating event on/through 
anyone of the above three layers to cause harm to the power 
system or induce it to fail. According to the three layers of 
power systems, malicious threats can be classified into physical 
threats, human threats, and cyber threats [5], [6]. Malicious 
attacks through physical layer can be sub-divided into terrorist 
attacks [7], war acts and sabotage. They are intentional 
destructive actions which intend to cause massive blackouts by 
destroying one or more components of a power system/network 
(substation, power plant, power unit, line, control center, 
transmission site, IT system, etc.) with direct damage on them, 
affecting the normal operation of the system. Human threats 
refer to the intentional operators’ intervention to cause 
problems for the normal functionality of the system especially 
on the most vulnerable points, which may be clearly identified 
for them. Malicious cyber threats can be divided into two types 
with respect to the attack procedure as malware and hacking, 
and are triggered by unauthorized access users who exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the power system cyber layer. 
The mechanism of these threats shows that the variety of 
the targets in power systems to be attacked is huge. Depending 
on the purposes of attackers, different parts of the system will 
be affected. The targets being attacked by initiates are usually 
chosen carefully and deliberately. Attackers with the 
willingness of causing massive blackouts will actively exploit 
system vulnerabilities to plot attack strategies in terms of when, 
how and where. The main challenge in achieving a desired 
security level is in using the resources in the best possible way 
[8]. Different budget allocation will obviously shape the shield 
against malicious attacks, yet we cannot shield them all at the 
 
 
This paper has been produced with the financial assistance of the 
SESAME project (a FP7-security project co-funded by the European 
Commission with grant number 261696, aiming at providing a contribution 
to the development of tools and a regulation framework for the security of 
the European power grid against natural, accidental and malicious attacks.  
 
 same level. This implies some kind of decision making, whose 
objective is to ensure the ability of the system to withstand 
some level of impacts from threats, by means of the 
enhancement of the infrastructure, with the best cost-benefit 
ratio. Preventive measures based on infrastructure 
enhancement consist of an extension of the available resources 
in the network, anticipating investments, which would not be 
necessary at this time, but which can secure the system against 
future potential coordinated attacks. This makes the network 
ready to lose some of its elements while keeping most of its 
performance. 
Different approaches already exist in literature for 
evaluating and modelling the resilience, reliability and security 
of power systems when subject to natural (extreme weather 
conditions) or malicious incumbent threats [11], [12], [13]. 
We designed a time-step simulation framework to 
chronologically simulate the system behavior after the 
occurrence of a contingency which initiates cascading failures 
[9], including automatic responses from existing protection 
schemes and human-driven operational strategies. The 
algorithm also provides a way to derive an optimal lost load 
recovering strategy (aiming at minimizing load shedding and 
maximizing load pick up) to accelerate the restoration of lost 
load. This simulation tool fits and serves in a proposed cost-
benefit analysis framework [14]. 
In the next section, the developed simulation framework 
will be briefly introduced. In section III we describe a decision 
making procedure based on cost-benefit analysis. We apply 
then the simulation framework to a real network (the Austrian 
transmission grid) as a study case to evaluate the technical and 
economic impacts of a coordinated malicious attack. The 
impacts of the attack will be compared between two cases: in 
the existing network without enhancement and in the 
reinforced system. The results are presented in section IV, 
where a cost-benefit analysis of the enhancement of the 
infrastructure to secure the Austrian power system against 
malicious attacks is also discussed. 
II. SIMULATION FRAMEWORK 
We developed a simulation framework to model the system 
behavior after the occurrence of a contingency; it provides 
system status snapshots for a predefined set of discrete time 
points. The system status includes both technical (e.g. bus 
voltages, element operational status, line flows, etc.) and 
economic (e.g. operational cost and unserved energy) 
information. An algorithm for making optimal decision of 
load/system restoration is taking into account load shedding 
minimization and load pick up maximization. This tool is 
designed to identify the most effective counteractions to reduce 
the vulnerability and provides a basis for economic evaluation 
of threats [15]. 
The tool carries out a fully integrated simulation 
considering: events that take place on the network (called 
“triggering events” like a generator trip), impacts (like 
unserved energy), and effectiveness of the protective measures 
(like damage cost reduction due to the addition of a new line to 
the network). 
The simulation tool structure includes three main modules: 
time control, system automatic response and optimal operation 
decision modules. The time control module schedules the 
sequence of functions and models automatic restoration of 
system elements (e.g. lines reclosure), operator interventions 
(e.g. manual load shedding), and load profile following (Fig. 
1). 
 
Fig. 1 High level flowchart of time function for simulation scheduling 
In the system automatic response module (Fig. 2), existing 
protection schemes (e.g. frequency and voltage control [16]) 
are modeled. As the main purpose of the study is to assess 
blackout impacts, to eventually evaluate and rank the effective 
countermeasures (especially long term plans of infrastructure 
enhancement), the simulation observation windows are hardly 
less than a minute. These sample times are predefined by the 
user to create a sequence of time-points in which system status 
snapshots could be represented. Human-driven restoration 
strategies cannot take place as fast as system automatic 
response: for this reason another time factor is introduced by 
the user to set the initial time of the restoration process and 
optimal decisions.  
Cascading failures may cause separation of a portion of the 
grid as an island. The designed simulation tool can handle 
islanding considering both automatic responses and restoration 
plans. If an island is in blackout, during restoration, a designed 
black-start algorithm re-energizes the island if possible (based 
on available resources considering load prioritization).  Islands 
can also get integrated again if interconnection lines are 
reclosed and the feasibility check module permits. 
As shown in Fig. 3, these restoration and integration 
schemes are all modeled in a module called optimal operation 
decision where a three step load restoration strategy is also 
applied. For each bus connected to loads, the user can 
introduce interruptible portion and sheddable loads. Sheddable 
load can be defined according to the regulations: for example, 
ENTSO-E sets 50% of loads as a sheddable portion during 
under frequency load shedding. Interruptible loads are 
considered as the lowest prioritized loads whose disconnection 
would cost less. A 3-step strategy is applied to find a feasible 
solution with the objective of minimum load shedding and 
 maximum restoration: S1 - restores all prioritized loads and 
tries to restore as much as possible the rest; S2 - restores all the 
non-sheddable loads and tries to restore as much as possible 
prioritized loads; S3 - restores as much as possible loads 
regardless of their priorities. 
 
Fig. 2 High level flowchart of system automatic response 
 
Fig. 3 High level flowchart of restoration optimal decision module 
The simulation results contain, for each system operational 
status, information on all network elements status (bus, branch, 
and generators), extra operational cost (the additional cost due 
to the adjustment of the generator and load power to mitigate 
the cascading effects of the triggering events), investment cost, 
unserved energy, etc. The outcome of the calculation core is 
used to generate maps/graphs of network topology containing 
operational status of components to replay the post-
contingency evolution. The developed algorithm is 
implemented in MATLAB® and compiled to build a stand-
alone software for post-contingency simulation of large-scale 
power systems, such as the European power transmission grid.  
III. DECISION MAKING BASED ON COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
During the cascading failures initiated by a contingency, 
some loads may not be supplied and system may experience 
some amount of unserved energy. This can be translated into 
economic losses by taking into account the unserved energy 
cost. To reduce this cost, different protection schemes or 
investment options can be considered, but as these 
countermeasures would also introduce some costs, they have to 
be compared through a cost-benefit analysis in advance.  
The key components to make decisions are summarized in 
the framework shown in Fig. 4. Due to budget limits to deploy 
new countermeasures for enhancement, a decision making is 
required to select the best possible options, considering 
cost/benefit ratio. We developed a time-step simulation tool to 
model the physical network and emulate system behavior after 
contingencies occur. From a list of most imminent threats 
collected in what we called “Threat Catalogue”, and the 
information from “Vulnerability Identification” which contains 
the list of most critical elements, affected network components 
can be defined as an input to the simulation tool. Enhancement 
options as “Countermeasures” are the other input to the 
network simulation tool. Different enhancement options can be 
compared in terms of benefit (reduction in the cost of unserved 
energy) and of cost (investments needed) to eventually rank 
them. The threat risk can be also ranked by comparing different 
threats along with corresponding countermeasures. In the 
following discussions, we briefly introduce the calculation 
framework to achieve this goal. 
Affected Network Components
Time Step Simulation of Physical Network Model
Countermeasures
Damage Assessment
Vulnerability Identification
Cost/benefit Analysis
Countermeasures Ranking Threats Risk Ranking
Threat Catalogue
Countermeasure Cost
 
Fig. 4 Framework of the Decision Support System key components 
A. Calculation framework for cost-benefit analysis 
As described before, to perform a cost-benefit analysis, the 
two components of damage assessment and countermeasure 
cost are needed (Fig. 4). The total blackout cost depends on the 
extra operational cost and economic loss to the society. To 
evaluate physical damages, we need to calculate extra 
operational cost and unserved energy cost. Extra operational 
cost is the added-up cost due to the adjustment in the generator 
and load to mitigate the effects of the triggering events. Extra 
operational cost sources are coded as set O (1) where i 
represents the source and gets 2 different IDs: “1” for generator 
extra operational cost, and “2” for load extra operational cost. 
 , {1,2}i O O∈ =  (1) 
Considering set S for the scenarios IDs, CG for the 
countermeasure group IDs, L for the loss events IDs, G for the 
generator IDs and set D for demands IDs (loads), the following 
assumptions are made: 
{1,2,..., },Sj S S n S∈ = ⊂ }  (2) 
0{0,1,2,..., },CGk CG CG n CG∈ = ⊂ }  (3) 
{1,2,..., },Ll L L n L∈ = ⊂ }  (4) 
{1,2,..., },Gg G G n G∈ = ⊂ }  (5) 
{1,2,..., },Dd D D n D∈ = ⊂ }  (6) 
 The set CG in (3) contains 0 to include the case without 
any countermeasures, i.e. the baseline for comparing the effects 
of applied countermeasures out of set CG. 
The main cost of frequency control is from the extra 
payment to the generator and load for compensating the 
deviation from their scheduled value. Supposing in the time 
interval t, generator g was ordered to change its output from 
Pg(t1) to Pg(t1+t), the extra operational cost for frequency 
control for scenario j, countermeasure group k and loss event l, 
is C(i,j,k,l) where i=1. Assuming Rg as the reserve of generator 
g, CRg as the cost of reserved power of generator g, and Cg  as 
the operational cost of generator g, (7) represents how we 
calculate generator extra operational cost. 
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Supposing, load d was ordered to change its consumption 
from Pd(t1) to Pd(t1+t), the extra operational cost of the loads 
for frequency control for scenario j, countermeasure group k 
and loss event l, is C(i,j,k,l) where i=2. (8) represents how we 
calculate load extra operational cost. 
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Where Cintd, Cshedd and Cnshedd are the prices for interruptible 
load, sheddable load and non-sheddable loads; Id and Sd are 
maximum for the interruptible load and the sheddable load. 
In the restoration phase, if the generator output changes 
with respect to the operational point, the extra operational cost 
is calculated as it is described in the frequency control 
countermeasure part. If the generator is off and the black start 
is being taken into account in the restoration phase, the extra 
operational cost is also calculated but considering the black 
start service cost. 
Countermeasure cost in Fig. 4 refers to the long-term 
investment for infrastructure enhancement. Considering set E 
as the set of invested elements under countermeasure group k, 
the total investment cost would be calculated as (10).  
{1,2,..., },
kk k E k
e E E n E∈ = ⊂ }  (9) 
1
( , , )( , , ) ( ( , , ))
( , , )
En init
inv Pere
e
e e
C j k lC j k l C j k l
D j k l=
= +∑  (10) 
Where Cinv is total investment cost, Cinite is initial investing 
cost of installation element e, De is depreciation year of the 
installation element e, and Cpere is the periodical cost of 
installation element e per year. 
Supposing the total blackout cost (including extra 
operational cost and social cost) for scenario j, and loss event l, 
without any countermeasures to be evaluated is CT(j,k,l) where 
k=0,  and the total blackout cost under the same scenario and 
the same loss event with countermeasure k is CT(j,k,l), then: 
( , , ) ( ,0, ) ( , , )M T TC j k l C j l C j k l= −  (12) 
( , , ) ( , , ) ( , , )invMB j k l C j k l C j k l= −  (13) 
where CM(j,k,l) is the reduced monetary loss of blackout under 
the same scenario with and without a specific countermeasure 
k, which signifies the impact on the level of the security of 
supply for the evaluated countermeasure k; B(j,k,l) is the gain 
of applying countermeasure k. 
After the calculation of all countermeasures under study 
over a reasonable set of scenarios, we can rank the impacts of 
different countermeasures on the level of security according to 
the CM(j,k,l), as well as selecting the highest cost-benefit 
countermeasures by ranking B(j,k,l). 
IV. CASE STUDY 
In this section, we introduce an example of application of 
the described tool for a cost-benefit analysis of infrastructure 
enhancement for the Austrian transmission system. The 
original data of the Austrian transmission system (extracted 
from Qiong Zhou and Janusz W. Bialek’s model of the 
European interconnected system [10]) was modified to ensure 
the n-1 contingency compliance for the load flow. Tie-lines are 
modeled with equivalent generators assigned to the buses 
geographically located in the neighboring countries. The 
capacity of each generator is set according to the capacity of 
the tie lines. The total generation capacity of the system is 
19400 MW and 16920 Mvar. The simplified model of the 
system has totally 14 generators representing neighboring 
buses as equivalent generators, and 25 generators located inside 
Austria. 114 transmission lines exist in this model connecting 
 49 buses. There are 19 loads with initial total consumption of 
6793 MW and 1888.5 Mvar. 
The benefits of adding two new lines (Fig. 5) are analyzed 
and compared with the base case in terms of unserved energy. 
This network enhancement was suggested by the Austrian 
Regulator (E-Control) based on their experience and on a 
vulnerability analysis of the network elements. The sequence 
of post-contingency failures (“cascading failure”) and the 
restoration actions over time is simulated for a total duration of 
500 minutes (over 8 hours).  
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Fig. 5 Triggering events destroy 2 buses - 2 additional lines are studied as 
long-term countermeasures 
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Fig. 6 Assumed load curve for the Austrian case 
The threat scenario is characterized by a coordinated 
terrorist attack which causes the failure of two big substations 
(bus 996 and 999) near Vienna (Fig. 5). The two substations 
are assumed to be out of service for the whole study period (the 
500 minutes). This kind of attacks requires the coordination of 
different people (groups) to be carried out. Therefore, the 
probability (events/year) would be lower than other events 
without this level of coordination/preparedness in advance. 
However in case of occurrence, the impact on the society can 
be huge. Vienna in fact is the capital and largest city of Austria. 
It has a population of around 1.7 million people, 2.4 million 
people within its metropolitan area (more than 20% of the 
Austrian population). With the same procedure explained in the 
previous section, investment benefits of adding two new 
transmission lines aiming at mitigating the impacts of power 
outage can be studied. 
Considering the time points set for the time function (every 
3 minutes for the automatic response iterations, every 45 
minutes for capturing the optimal operation decision snapshots, 
and 30 min as the initiating time of the optimal decision 
process) and the changes in the load (discretized 24-h load 
curve shown in Fig. 6) the simulation tool provides 21 different 
snapshots of the system in terms of frequency, bus voltages, 
line flows and congestions, generator operation status, 
islanding information, unserved energy in each load, etc. 
As described before, evolution of snapshots would provide 
insights to the technical aspects of system status which are 
interesting for power system operators, but what would 
eventually play an important role in decision making of long-
term infrastructure enhancement is the assessment of 
corresponding damage cost and economic losses. Therefore, in 
this example, we focus on the amount of total unserved energy 
in the two different cases, with and without new lines. 
Fig. 7 represents the load shedding percentage of some 
buses with respect to the expected demand from the load 
profiles. Although loads 1009 and 1011 experience less 
interruptions in the case without the new lines, the blackout in 
bus 1010 during the whole studied time (8 hours) results in a 
large amount of unserved energy. On the contrary, in the case 
with the two new lines, bus 1010 is being continuously 100% 
supplied. 
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Fig. 7 Load shedding tracking – without and with adding new lines 
Fig. 8 shows the last snapshot for the two cases.  Thanks to 
one of the new lines, bus 1009 near Vienna with 308 MW load 
could be saved and served during the post-contingency 
evolution of the system, and that eventually resulted in a lower 
unserved energy in the case with countermeasures. The total 
unserved energy during the 500 minutes is 13631.5 MWh for 
the base case, and it is reduced to 11616.7 MWh in the case 
with the two additional lines. In order to monetize the impact 
of the new lines on the level of security of supply, the total 
costs should be compared. To calculate the cost of unserved 
energy, we use the simplified relation Cu= G/E in which Cu is 
the cost of unserved energy, G is the GDP and E is the 
domestic electricity consumption. In this simulation scenario, 
G and E values are taken from key statistics 2011 report of the 
Austrian regulator (E-Control) [17]. The calculated cost of 
unserved energy is Cu= 3800 €/MWh for year 2010. Therefore, 
the economic loss would be reduced from 51,799,700 € to 
44,143,460 € with a saving of 7,656,240 € if the small amount 
of extra operational cost is neglected. This difference is 
actually the avoided cost thanks to the enhancement of the 
transmission system with two new lines. Comparing this 
avoided cost with the investment cost results in what we called 
 gain of applying the countermeasure. However, it should be 
noted that the study time window is 8 hours, in which a lot of 
large loads could not get restored in the case without additional 
lines. Therefore, the amount of unserved energy until the end 
of recovery process gets very high, which highlights the 
effectiveness of the new lines in the cost-benefit analysis. 
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Fig. 8 Last snapshot – without and with invested lines 
V. CONCLUSION 
On one side threats to the electricity infrastructures 
security, especially malicious attacks are drawing increasing 
attentions due to their variety of targets and huge impacts. On 
the other side investment is needed for maintaining a certain 
level of security. Multiple options of infrastructure 
enhancement to secure the system against attacks need to be 
justified and selected before investing, due to limited budgets. 
In this paper, we applied a time step simulation tool with cost-
benefit analysis capabilities to show how appropriate 
infrastructure enhancement could reduce attack impacts on 
power systems. As a case study, we designed a catastrophic 
scenario of malicious attack on the Austrian transmission 
network to evaluate the effectiveness of system structural 
reinforcement on unserved energy reduction. The simulation 
results of the case study show that adding two new lines to the 
system would reduce 15% of damage cost only from the point 
of view of unserved energy cost. The reduction in practice 
would be much higher: firstly because recovery process after 
occurrence of such a huge attack takes much longer than only 8 
hours, which eventually results in a larger amount of unserved 
energy; secondly, because in the damage assessment, the 
economic loss is not calculated based only on the unserved 
energy cost, but also the monetized impacts of the outage on 
society is taken into account. Nevertheless, applying the 
developed framework, taking into account other options of 
infrastructure enhancement, could help decision makers to 
invest on the most appropriate choices. One of the added 
transmission lines has already been installed in the real network 
to enhance the level of security of transmission in Austria, and 
this can verify and validate the obtained results of this 
simulation framework. 
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